[2014] The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime Failure
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The North Korean Nuclear Isue and the Six-Party Talks: The Logic of Regime Failure
Sangtu KO (Yonsei University)
Introduction
The objective of the Six-Party Talks is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But the
talks have failed to achieve this goal, although four participating countries surrounding the
Korean Peninsula, namely the United States, China, Russia, and Japan are among the
strongest countries in the world in terms of military and economic power. They are also the
biggest countries in terms of population and territory. The fact hat he great powers could not
preven the smal and impoverished nation of North Korea from becoming a nuclear power
represents a failure of collective action.
In April 203, after North Korea revealed its highly enriched uranium (HEU)
weapons program, China convened trilateral talks to stabilize rapidly escalating tensions
between the US and North Korea. It expanded these talks, evolving them into Six-Party Talks
to encompass Japan, South Korea, and Russia. 1 The Bush administration agreed to a
multilateral framework for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. In May 209, Pyongyang eventually walked out of the Six-Party Talks, in which six countries had held six
rounds of negotiations over six years. In 205, the negotiations succeeded in coming to an
agreement, called the September 19 Joint Statement, in which the North committed to
abandon its nuclear program and return to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in exchange
for food and energy assistance. However, a series of obstacles hindered the implementation of
the agreement. The delivery of light-water nuclear power plants to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was delayed due to opposition from the US Senate. In July 2006,
the DPRK responded by test firing ballistic missiles over the Sea of Japan and staged an
underground nuclear test in October. After the resumption of the Six-Party Talks in 207,
implementation was agreed upon anew. In July of that year, International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspectors were allowed into North Korea to monitor its nuclear facilities, and in November North Korea began to disable its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.
In response, US President George W. Bush suspended sanctions on North Korea
applied under the Trading with the Enemy Act in June 208 and removed North Korea from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism in October. However, this was a largely symbolic act as
President Bush reinstated many of the restrictions against North Korea at the same time. The
United States criticized North Korea for its incomplete declaration of nuclear facilities. North
Korea accused the Bush administration of being reluctant to remove sanctions and later
protested that Japan and the ROK had not fulfilled their commitments to deliver one million
tons of heavy fuel oil as promised in the agreement. In 2008, the talks were deadlocked when
1 John Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, 205, p.
76.2
the North conducted a second nuclear test. Despite the failure of the Six-Party Talks, most of the concerned countries still
consider the talks the only way to address the long-standing nuclear crisis on the Korean
Peninsula. China and Russia have consistently demanded that all concerned parties resume
negotiations without any preconditions.2 The former North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, showed his readiness to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.3 The US wants to maintain dialogue with
North Korea because there seems to be no other option for dissuading North Korea from
pursuing a nuclear weapons program without the Six-Party Talks. The US, Japan, and South
Korea want o return to the negotiating table once North Korea takes the key steps agreed
upon.4 Because the Six-Party Talks have not lost heir practical usefulness, it is worth finding
the cause of the failure and elaborating on ways to improve the talks. The Six-Party Talks are
a multilateral arrangement and a kind of international institution, specifically, an international
security regime. In this context, this article aims to examine the reason why the talks failed
from the perspective of regime theory.
The existing literature deals mostly with the Six-Party Talks from the perspective of
the actors, and attributes their failure to China’s support of North Korea or the fact hat North
Korea insists on sticking to its nuclear weapons development program. In contrast o the actor
approach, this article tries to find the rot causes of the failure of the Six-Party Talks from the
institutional approach. The logical ground for selecting this approach lies in the fact that the
Six-Party Talks represent an institutional attempt to solve the North Korean nuclear problem.
International problems can hardly be solved by a single country. Even a super power often
resorts to a multilateral institution to increase the effectiveness of its problem-solving
capability.5
In this context, the United States started the Six-Party Talks to secure the
collaboration of the Northeast Asian countries. This means the US sought a multilateral
approach after the Geneva Framework had failed as a bilateral approach. The United States
realized it alone could not tackle the North Korean nuclear problem and tried to gain the
greatest possible assistance from the concerned countries.
Regime theory will provide a significant framework for analyzing the Six-Party Talks. It is worth noting, however, that the existing research on international regimes focuses on
how to reach an agreement. The Six-Party Talks are a key case in which participants reached
an agreement that was not fulfilled. In this instance, the problem has been non-compliance
with the terms of the agreement. Against this background, this article seeks to distinguish
between two stages of regime formation and regime implementation, and argues that the Six- Party Talks succeeded in regime formation but failed in regime implementation. Thus, this
2 Ralph A. Cosa, “Six-Party Talks: Will/Should They Resume?” American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 34,
No.1, 2012.
3 Peter Ford, “Why only North Korea May Be Ready for Six-Party Talks,” Christian Science Monitor, August
31, 2010. 4 Peter Ford and Donald Kirk, “North and South Korea: Path to Six-Party Talks Rocky, but Still Open,”
Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 201. 5 Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, 19783
article’s goal is to find the obstacles of regime implementation and suggest effective ways to
make agreements fulfilled in the case of the Six-Party Talks. This article’s research question is: What institutional failure did the Six-Party Talks
confront with. Specifically, what prevented the Six-Party Talks from successful
implementation of their agreement? To answer this question, this article is constructed as
follows. The first section will review the existing literature about the Six-Party Talks and
regime theory. This analysis of previous research works will help develop a framework that
suits the research aim of this article. The second section will investigate the institutional
deficiencies that caused non-compliance with the Six-Party Talks agreement. The concluding
section highlights the important factors influencing the fulfillment of regime agreement.
Literature Review and Framework
During the Cold War the dominant concept of security was balance of power expressed in
military alliances. Alternative security concepts or security regimes created since the end of
the Cold War have attracted much attention in the academic world. Krasner defines a regime
as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 6 An
international regime has several strengths. First, it is an efficient method because it lowers
intervention costs and, according to Jervis, a security regime is perceived to better foster
peace and stability than individual states do. The individualistic pursuit of peace is to costly
and to instant compared to the regime approach.7
Second, an international regime is an effective method because it can achieve results
more speedily than an international organization, which is too big and sluggish. International
politics is becoming complex and the magnitude of global issues demands a variety of
tailored solutions. In these circumstances, an international regime is better suited to solving
such issues than an international organization. An international regime seeks to build legal
constructs and realize its institutional expression in rules and regulations, whereas an
international organization needs formal institutions such as budgets, staffs, offices, etc. In
terms of its institutionalization level, a regime is in a position between dialogue and
organization. From this viewpoint, a regime can be more or less easily built if it is required to
tackle a specific problem such as trade, peace, human rights, environment etc. Third, an international regime is a decentralized method of achieving a solution.
Regime theory shares the assumption that the international system is composed of national
states without a world government, which can enforce international rules and norms. In this
circumstance, sovereign states need to cooperate to replace the central authority lacking in
6 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as Intervening Variables,” in
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes (Ithaca MA: Cornell University Pres, 1983), p. 2. 7 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, Vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, p. 360.4
international politics. In a sense, an international regime is a product of inter-state efforts to
assemble powers used to maintain international peace.
International regimes are, however, intrinsically a weak and fragile construct. Like
contracts, international regimes represent agreements among states, and the liabilities of the
agreements are subject to alteration or abrogation by sovereign states. The arrangements lack
any enforcing or executing agencies, unlike international organizations. They are designed
not to implement the centralized enforcement of agreements, but rather to establish patterns
of behavior that will allow the parties to adapt their practices to the agreed consensus.8 The
principal significance of international regimes lies in their legal construction. The parties
concerned try to establish an order by making rules and laws in anarchic international politics.
Thus, the denouncement of the legal system leads to the collapse of the relevant regime. The
agreement can be frequently overturned by any of the participating countries. Therefore, it
can be argued that the success of regimes depends on how to establish institutional
constraints on the behavior of sovereign states. Institutional constraints will help induce all
parties to comply with the agreed rules. In this context, regimes need to arrange some mechanisms for their viability and
effectiveness. Cooperation is possible, even among self-interested actors if an international
institution facilitates cooperation. The question is whether the institution can apply sufficient
pressure to bring about cooperation. First, it needs a mechanism that improves the asymmetry
of information. Informational functions of regimes are the most important of all. The actors
have to reveal information and their own preferences fully to one another. Otherwise, the
actors have to worry about being deceived and double-crossed. Asymmetrical information is
a problem not merely of insufficient information, but also of distorted information. Thus,
asymmetries of information are not rectified simply by communication. The required
information is not merely information about other governments’ resources and formal
negotiating positions, but also accurate knowledge of their future positions. In a sense, upgrading the quality of available information can help ensure commitments are kept and
deceptions avoided. 9 To reduce information asymmetry, regimes usually involve
international organizations The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime (NPT) incorporates the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors suspicious nuclear
development programs. International organizations provide forums for meetings and
secretariats that evaluate the quality of information and provide reliable information equally
to all members.
Second, the effectiveness of collective action depends on the incentive structure.
Incentives usually mean economic benefits such as financial aid or economic cooperation.
Providing exclusive information can also be involved in the incentive. According to the logic
of collective action, individual incentive is important for providing collective gods. Self-
8 Robert O. Keohane, “A Functional Theory of Regimes,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds.) International
Politics. Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, (New York: Longman Publishers, 203), p. 131
9 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:
Princeton University Pres, 1984)5
interested individuals will not necessarily comply with their common or group interests
without special incentives. Collective goods have different characteristics from private goods.
They are available to all individuals. This means access to collective goods cannot be
restricted and the use of the goods does not reduce their availability to others. This causes a
free-ride tendency in which each member of the group wants other members to pay the costs
of providing collective gods because every member will benefit from them, regardless of
whether or not he pays for them.10
Figure 1 Framework of Analysis on the Effectiveness of the Six-Party Talks
Issue linkage raises the effectiveness of incentives insofar as the clustering of issues
increases the readiness of recipients to comply with an agreement. Therefore, linkages among
issues create additional mechanisms for making actors implement mutually beneficial
agreements. The nesting patterns of international regimes help link particular issues and
arrange side payments, giving someone something on one issue in return for help on another.
Linkages among particular issues within the context of regimes further strengthen the
effectiveness of regimes since the consequences of such behavior as deception and
irresponsibility are likely to extend beyond the issue on which they are manifested.
Successful regimes organize issue areas so that productive linkages are facilitated, while
destructive linkages inconsistent with regime principles are discouraged.
Third, sanctions as negative incentives contribute to overcoming the limitations of
incentives. Incentives have limitations because some actors may be irresponsible, making it
difficult or impossible to carry out commitments they may make. In these circumstances, the
regime’s effectiveness will suffer without external coercion or engagement. Sanctions
10 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 1971).6
mitigate problems of moral hazard. They include diplomatic isolation, economic embargo,
and military action. Sanctions supplement the incentive structure in such a way as to
discourage less cooperative behavior and prevent irresponsible behavior.
As reviewed above, the quality of information, incentives, issue linkage, and
sanctions are important contributing factors to the effectiveness of international regimes.
These factors can be classified into three groups: power-based, interest-based, and cognitive- based factors. The research question in this article is why the Six-Party Talks did not achieve
their desired goal of implementing the agreement. We will try to find explanations to this
question based on the three factors. Thus, we will examine each factor to fully appreciate the
functioning and effectiveness of the Six-Party Talks.1
Institutional Deficiencies of the Six-Party Talks
Asymmetrical Information
When China launched the Six-Party Talks in August 2003 it became a crucial player in
dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 202. China accepted the
Six-Party Talks as a multilateral arrangement because the North Korean nuclear issue is vital
to China's security and cannot be left to the sole mandate of the US.12 This raised hopes for a
resolution of the nuclear dispute between the US and North Korea because China is believed
to have the potential to impose and enforce a denuclearization. The degree of cooperation in collective action depends on the quality of knowledge
available. With regard to informational function, China should have reduced the asymmetry
of information among participating countries by thoroughly examining and distributing the
position and strategy of North Korea in its nuclear development issues. However, China has
always tried to devote its leadership to genuine mediation and confine itself to the role of
honest broker. In the Asian tradition, mediation is often regarded as meddling. In this context,
China sought to serve as a neutral and harmonious mediator in the Six-Party Talks.13 The
Chinese diplomatic style of the talks, characterized by reconciliatory and open-ended
leadership, cared for the positions of all the parties, including North Korea, whose breach of
agreement merited punishment and dampened down the effectiveness of the Six-Party
Talks.14
1 Mathew Fuhrman and Jefrey D. Berejikian, "Disaggregating Noncompliance Abstention versus Predation
in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2012. 12 Gilbert Rozman, “Post Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional Institutions in Northeast Asia,”
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2010.
13 Cheng Qian, “The Art of China’s Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian
Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 36, No. 2, 209. 14 Michele Acuto, “Not Quite the Dragon: A Chinese View on the Six-Party Talks, 202-8,” International
History Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2012.7
In addition to China’s passive role, there was a structural constraint on information sharing
and distribution. First, there was a line-up of five countries opposed to North Korea’s
possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, the five parties had to explore the differences of their
positions and how they could be narrowed. Instead of solidifying their cooperation, this
process deepened existing divisions. During the Six-Party Talks period, relations among the
parties have deteriorated and become less conducive to reaching a favorable outcome. US ties
with Russia deteriorated rapidly from 2003 to 2007 as Putin succeeded in rapidly invigorating
the Russian economy. The Iraq War in 203 alienated Beijjng and Moscow and emboldened
them to fortify their mutual security ties. In 205, Japanese-South Korean relations suffered
from Japan’s claims over the Dokdo Islands and its handling of past history. This prevented
the five from reaching consensus on a strategy for solving the nuclear crisis.15
Second, the participating countries were divided into two groups: China, Russia, and North
Korea on the one side, and the US, Japan, and South Korea on the other side. Information
sharing in the Six-Party Talks suffered from a confrontation between the two sub-groups.16
Collective action in the Six-Party Talks was especially difficult because the actors had
different access to information. The two groups have met and exchanged their views and
strategic positions separately. These two separate trilateral information flow systems
consolidated asymmetry of information. Washington relied on its consultations with Seoul and
Tokyo, as well as on trilateral coordination, to spur cooperation within the group.17 After their
trilateral consultation, the US, Japan, and South Korea agreed to a set of principles to
dismantle the North Korean nuclear program, calling for “coordinated steps.” They presented
their joint proposal to China, which delivered it to North Korea.18
Another factor raising the quality of information is utilizing international
organizations. The Six-Party Talks expected monitoring assistance from the IAEA of the
North Korean nuclear development program. However, the IAEA was not fully utilized for
information gathering.
North Korea has always tried to circumvent the IAEA’s monitoring activities. It
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and a safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which requires North Korea to report all
nuclear programs to the IAEA. The agreement also gave the IAEA the right to conduct a
range of inspections of North Korean nuclear installations and programs in 1992, although
the safeguards agreement was scheduled to be signed within one year after signing the NPT.
Even after that, North Korea continued to refuse IAEA inspections of facilities designated
15 Gilbert Rozman, "The North Korean nuclear crisis and US strategy in Northeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 47,
No. 4, 207, p. 608-9.
16 Xintian Yu, “China and Northeast Asian Regional Security Cooperation,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 2,
205.
17 Victor Cha, “Complex Patchworks: US Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy, No.
1, 201, p. 42.
18 Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation and Policy Recommendations,” Pacific Focus, Vol. 19, No.2, 208, p. 25.8
under the safeguards agreement.19 The IAEA could visit North Korean nuclear sites only
when all parties in the Six-Party Talks agreed to its technical mission.
Narrow Incentive
The problem of incentives in the Six-Party Talks lies in the unequal readiness to shoulder the
burden of providing incentives to North Korea. The US, Japan, and South Korea are major
participants. South Korea and Japan promised to provide incentives such as food and heavy
fuel oil deliveries, while the US offered security assurances and release from trade
restrictions etc. This difference comes from divergent solutions the parties have pursued in
dealing with North Korea. South Korea preferred a Ukrainian model and was ready to
provide large-scale financial assistance, whereas the US insisted on a Libyan case approach
and just promised to help North Korea integrate into the international community.20
Although these initiatives contributed to reaching the denuclearization agreement, China and Russia escaped from providing any incentives. Russia possesses little of its once
formidable political and economic power. In contrast to Russia, China has been wiling to
supply food and oil. But it did not offer to help as an incentive in exchange for nuclear
dismantlement, but to prop up the North Korean regime. China views the threat from the
North more as a failed state and humanitarian disaster that can trigger a flood of refuges into
Northern China. In sum, they have scarcely participated in the incentive system, which was a
prerequisite for all parties in implementing the September 205 Agreement. Issue linkage is generally considered to catalyze consensus by enlarging the win-set
size and allowing for agreement between conflicting parties who would otherwise not achieve
a resolution.21 North Korea demanded the normalization of its relationship with the US in
exchange for giving up its nuclear development. Contrary to this expectation, the US made it
clear that diplomatic normalization and the dismantling of the nuclear program were two
different subjects. Full diplomatic normalization could be possible only after other pending
issues such as ballistic missiles, biological and chemical weapons, and conventional forces
were addressed. Thus, the US refused to link a peace treaty with nuclear issues and provide it
as an incentive.2
Issue linkage can lead to constructive and destructive effects in negotiations. Linking
19 Lary Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” CRS Issue Brief or Congress, January 27, 205,
p. 10.
20 John Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, 205, p.
79. 21 Thomas Scheling, The strategy of conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pres 1980). 2 Christoph Bluth, “The United States and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Explaining the Failure of
the Six-Party Talks,” IPRI Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 206.9
an intractable issue can lead the negotiation to deadlock.23 In this case, issue linkage would
result in an issue spillover and unravel an agreement. In the Six-Party Talks it was found that
some issue linkages were not aimed at resolving the nuclear issue. Japan linked the
abductions issue with the nuclear issue. This adversely affected the implementation process in
the Six-Party Talks.24 Japan has participated in the Six-Party Talks because it has been very
concerned for a long time about how to respond to North Korea's development of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. However, the Japanese Government started to address the
issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. The Japanese
public demanded that the abduction issue be resolved, a demand that drove the government
into a negative position in the context of the talks.25
Limited Sanctions
Sanctions are regarded as critical to the viability of the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has
endured economic sanctions by the US for the past half century. This means economic
sanctions have not worked with North Korea, which has maintained an autarkic economic
system. Therefore, the implementation of an agreement in the talks could be effective only
when the issue of sanctions was not limited to the economic area. However, the parties in the
talks could not go beyond it.26
China is believed to have considerable leverage as the largest trade partner and
supplier of aid to North Korea and has reiterated that it does not want a nuclear-armed DPRK. However, it has always been reluctant to pressure the North to give up its nuclear program. In
response to the US demand for China to use its influence over Pyongyang, China has often
shown a dubious attitude, claiming its influence is minimal. This does not mean China is
necessarily happy with the Kim regime though. China only wants the DPRK to iniitate
economic reform after the Chinese model.27
Having successfully hosted the Six-Party Talks, China pushed to institutionalize them. Such an initiative was surprising, because China has long maintained a passive, negative, and
defensive posture against multilateral cooperative security arrangements. 28 It has had
23 James Sebenius, “Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First?” In Richard Zeckhauser,
Ralph Keney, and James K. Sebenius (eds.), Wise decisions (Boston: Harvard Business School Press 196). 24 Kuniko Ashizawa, “Tokyo’s Quandary, Beijjng’s Moment in the Six-Party Talks: A Regional Multilateral
Approach to Resolve the DPRK’s Nuclear Problem,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, 206; Linus Hagstrom,
“Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy,”
European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 208.
25 Tsuneo Akaha, “Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem,” Journal of Asian & African Studies, Vol.
42, No. 3/4, 207.
26 Jaewo Cho, “Is Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks Possible?” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4, 205.
27 Christoph Bluth, “The United States and the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Explaining the Failure of
the Six-party Talks,” IPRI Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 206. 28 Jaewo Cho, “Is Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks Possible?” East Asia: An International Quarterly, 10
reservations both about institutions that could undermine its narrow notion of sovereignty and
norms that are often used to impose long-feared universal values by Western countries. China’s active support for the Six-Party Talks does not necessarily mean it is ready to endorse
strong regional organizations in Northeast Asia.
While China has expressed permissive support for United Nations Security Council
measures, it has avoided excesses that might lead to a regime collapse in North Korea.29
China does not want the North Korean regime to collapse under US military and economic
pressure and prefers the continued existence of the two Koreas, with the North acting as a
buffer state. China wants to avoid instability or even a military conflagration in its backyard.
Political leaders in China have emphasized peaceful foreign policies that empower sustained
development based on integration in the world economy. This indicates China is more
concerned about sustaining the North Korean regime and preventing a second Korean War
than eliminating the North's nuclear capability.
Besides geopolitical interests, there are several reasons for China’s indecision over
North Korea’s nuclear issue. These include China's emotional ties with North Korea and
empathy with its position as the weakest party in the talks, conflicting attitudes within the
Chinese Government itself towards the North, and competing interests with, and lack of trust
in the US.30
South Korea has taken the nuclear issue very seriously because of its direct
ramifications for South Korean security. However, the South Korean Government maintained
a policy of reconciliation toward North Korea until 2008 under the Roh Mohyun
administration. It was convinced the only chance of transforming the DPRK was through a
policy of engagement that did not have any consideration for coercive tools that imposed
costs on North Korea. On the contrary, the United States even considered a military attack. However, the
South Korean public was worried the US might launch a pre-emptive strike without
consulting the Government of South Korea and that US military strikes would provoke a
devastating North Korean reprisal. This was manifested in South Korean poll data that
revealed 39 per cent of the respondents perceived the United States to be the greatest threat to
South Korea, whereas only 3 per cent saw North Korea in the same light.31 A survey in
2005 showed that in the event of a war between the United States and North Korea, 47.6 per
cent of the respondents believed the South Korean Government should side with North Korea,
and 31.2 per cent indicated that it should support the United States.32 These survey results
indicate the serious difficulties involved in military intervention against North Korea.
Vol. 2, No. 4, 205.
29 Ch