The Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is being held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from April 28 to May 9. On April 30 at 3:00 PM, the NGO Statement Session took place, with the participation of all delegations to the Treaty.

At this session, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK) delivered an NGO statement titled “Permanent Peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia Through the Abolition of Extended Deterrence and the Dismantling of Alliances!” The statement was authored by Young-Dae Ko, Co-Representative of SPARK, and was delivered by Juyeon JC Rhee, representing SPARK at the conference.

SPARK’s statement was endorsed by numerous organizations and individuals, including Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Channing and Popai Liem Education Corporation, Citizen's Solidarity for Peace & Unification, Korean American Peace Fund, LABRATS International, Nuclear Energy Information Service, NuclearBan.US, Peace Action Network of Lancaster, Peace Action New York State, World BEYOND War, and various individuals affiliated with these and other peace organizations.

NGO Statement at the Third Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference

“Permanent Peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia

Through the Abolition of Extended Deterrence and the Dismantling of Alliances!”

Young-Dae Ko, Co-Representative of SPARK

At this very moment, nuclear confrontations on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia are even more intensifying. Regional countries are engaging in unprecedented nuclear confrontation by strengthening extended deterrence and nuclear alliances, adopting the highly aggressive doctrine of preemptive nuclear strikes, enhancing nuclear forces, and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the field, thus lowering the threshold for nuclear use and significantly increasing the countries’ reliance on nuclear weapons. 

In 2023, the ROK and the U.S. established the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and in 2024, they formulated the “Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula.” These guidelines focus on increasing the frequency and intensity of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, such as strategic bombers and nuclear submarines, on the Korean Peninsula, while also integrating the U.S. nuclear forces and South Korea’s advanced conventional forces through Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI). This is a strengthening of extended deterrence at the policy and strategic level, aiming to maximize deterrence and threat against North Korea by increasing the survivability of nuclear delivery systems and improving the precision of nuclear strikes through CNI, thereby enhancing their effectiveness. 

Accordingly, South Korea and the U.S. established Operational Plan 5022 against North Korea. This plan is the operational plan of the Indo-Pacific Command (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command) led by conventional forces, and is based on preemptive strikes against North Korea. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command’s Operation Plan 8010-12 against North Korea, led by nuclear forces, is being implemented. This plan is also based on preemptive strikes against North Korea. With the implementation of the “Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula” and CNI, it is more likely that Operational Plan 5022 will be linked with Operational Plan 8010-12 and operated as a subsystem of it, thereby increasing the likelihood that the deterrence and operations against North Korea will be carried out with nuclear forces. Moreover, Operational Plan 5022 has evolved into a more offensive operational plan that strengthens its aggressive posture by incorporating cyber warfare and special operations, enabling a preemptive attack even at the mere indication/sign that North Korea might use nuclear weapons.

The United States developed low-yield nuclear warheads of 5-7 kilotons during the first Trump administration and deployed them operationally on nuclear submarines in 2019. The deployment of these tactical nuclear weapons has increased the likelihood that the United States may resort to a preemptive use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. In the second Trump administration, if these tactical nuclear weapons are mounted on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N), the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be further lowered. 

In 2022, the DPRK revised its “Law on the DPRK’s Nuclear Forces Policy,” shifting from a second-strike, defensive nuclear doctrine to a first-strike (preemptive), offensive nuclear doctrine. This is a countermeasure to the establishment of the Indo-Pacific Command’s operational plans, which professed a preemptive attack. The DPRK has also deployed tactical nuclear weapons, including the Whasan-31, mounted on eight types of delivery systems. “The Law on the DPRK’s Nuclear Forces Policy” stipulates that nuclear weapons can be used “in case the need for operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of a war and taking the initiative in the war in contingency is inevitably raised,” (Article 6, Paragraph 4). The DPRK is expected to launch anticipatory strikes against (reinforced) U.S. forces at sea and on land using either unmanned underwater attack vehicles or short-range ballistic missiles with survival rates enhanced through evasive maneuver. 

Strengthening mutual (extended) deterrence between the DPRK and the United States is an inevitable product of strengthening alliances. In 2023, the leaders of South Korea, the United States, and Japan established a de facto trilateral military alliance at the Camp David summit and pledged to strengthen extended deterrence against North Korea, as part of which they adopted the “Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula” (2024.7) and the U.S.-Japan’s ”Guidelines for Extended Deterrence” (2024.12) The United States and Japan have also formulated a joint operational plan focused on the mobilization of U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea with the aim of intervening in a cross-strait conflict. Furthermore, they seek to involve not only Japan’s Self-Defense Forces but also South Korean forces in this conflict. In response to this, in 2024, the DPRK and Russia restored its alliance by signing a “Russia-DPRK comprehensive strategic partnership treaty.” Article 4 (military assistance during wartime) and Article 8 (strengthening defense capabilities during peacetime) of this treaty imply the possibility of Russia providing extended deterrence to North Korea. 

The second Trump administration’s “Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance” designates China as the United States' “sole pacing threat” and prioritizes preventing China’s “seizure of Taiwan,” thereby exacerbating nuclear confrontations in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Moreover, the guidance foists the burden of deterrence and defense against Russia, North Korea, and Iran onto regional allies and nations, such as NATO and the South Korea-Japan quasi-alliance, pressuring these countries to increase defense spending and military buildup. This, in turn, is fueling global and regional arms races and encourages nuclear armament in South Korea, Taiwan, and Iran. As a result, a new Cold War system centered around the U.S.-China rivalry as a zero-sum game is inevitable. The possibility that a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia could escalate into a global nuclear conflict is hardly new. In particular, if the "Golden Dome for America" promoted by the second Trump administration is established, the nuclear balance will dramatically tilt in favor of the United States, leading to a nuclear confrontation surpassing that of the Cold War era—bringing humanity a significant step closer to a nuclear Armageddon that could hasten its annihilation.

However, any threat in the name of deterrence or any preemptive strike in the name of an imminent attack by an enemy is illegal. The threat of nuclear weapon violates Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat of force, and Article 1, Paragraph (d) of the TPNW, which prohibits the threat of nuclear weapons use, with no exceptions. The use of nuclear weapons violates the principle of distinction, the principle of prohibiting unnecessary suffering, and the Martens clause under international humanitarian law. Preemptive attack, whether nuclear or conventional, violates Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which stipulates the exercise of the right to self-defense only after an “armed attack” has occurred. Nuclear use, even in the context of self-defense, is contrary to the principle of necessity and proportionality.

Extended deterrence, threat through force, and preemptive attacks shatter peace in peacetime and are bound to bring crises and wars. Not to mention it goes without saying that nuclear war would utterly annihilate humanity’s lives, and its objects, and nature. Therefore, the international community must urgently abolish the doctrines of extended deterrence and preemptive attacks, and dismantle military alliances that adopt these illegal doctrines. With this, the tarnished United Nations Charter (Article 2/ Paragraph 4, Article 51) and the UN-led collective security can also be revived.

The only way to prevent war and permanently establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is to conclude a peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula to legally and institutionally end the Korean War, realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by guaranteeing the safety of the North’s regime and its security through the conclusion of the North-U.S. non-aggression treaty and, based on this, replace extended deterrence and military alliances with a regional common security framework for Northeast Asia. This will serve as the priming water for the establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone and global denuclearization.