


A Korean peninsula peace agreement to end war and division



The Seeds of Peace





End the Korean War!
Live in peace!
Move toward
reunification!

War is near, peace is far away

For more than 60 years, the Korean peninsula has been in a chronic state of tension, on the brink of war, perpetually mobilized for war, as the United States and North Korea, South Korea and North Korea confront each other. The Korean people, whether South or North haven't lived in peace even for a moment.

Along with this, the United States and China are engaged in a test of strength, each one trying to change the order in Northeast Asia to its own advantage. The United States is building up the South Korea-US-Japan military alliance in order to maintain its superior strength against China. And as Japan thinks that in the future it will occupy the position of East Asia's leading power, it has set out on the path of renewed aggression. China opposes the creation of the South Korea-US-Japan military alliance and calls on the United States to establish a "new great power (C2) relationship".

What must be done to keep Korea from being sucked into the hurricane of great-power rivalry in Northeast Asia?

How can Koreans defend themselves from being victimized again and how can we protect the interests of the people and the nation?

Only the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement can end the Korean War, make peace a reality, and normalize relations between North Korea and the United States, and South Korea and North Korea. It is the only way that makes it possible to progress toward reunification on the Korean peninsula.

Only through the conclusion of peace agreement can we achieve independence, peace, and reunification as desired by the Korean people. And only in this way is it possible to establish a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Common Security and Peace and to open the way toward peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity.



End the Korean War!

A peace agreement has still not been concluded even now, more than 60 years after the Korean War cease-fire. Converting the state of cease-fire to a state of peace is long overdue.

The Korean peninsula on the brink of war: Where does the danger come from?

The antagonistic confrontations between North Korea and the United States, and between the South and the North, have intensified even more. Being on the verge of war is an everyday matter.

The United States and South Korea have built up so powerful a combined warfighting capabilities in South Korea that they can change the North Korean regime and occupy North Korea by force.

Furthermore, the United States is forcing South Korea to join the triangular SK-US-Japan missile defense network and military alliance for the announced purpose of countering the North Korean nuclear missile threat.

For this purpose, the United States promoted the creation of the military information sharing arrangement among SK and the US and Japan and encourages Japan to change the interpretation of article 9 of the Japanese

constitution, so that Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense.

The SK-US authorities have put in place a “tailored deterrence strategy” according to which the SK-US forces could carry out a preemptive strike if there were any indication that the North would use nuclear weapons.

Another strategy is the so-called “Combined Counter-Provocation Plan”. That is an SK-US contingency plan against NK’s local provocations, according to which the SK-US forces would strike not only the local unit where provocations began, but also supporting and commanding units.

Does the danger of war on the Korean peninsula truly come from the North Korean “nuclear missile threat”? Or does the danger come rather from the SK-US authorities’ aggressive anti-North Korea military strategy, such as the tailored deterrent strategy or the contingency plan against NK’s local provocations?

The Korean peninsula nuclear problem: Sown and cultivated by the United States

During the Korean War, the United States considered the use of atomic weapons on at least two occasions.

In 1957, in violation of the Korean War Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953, the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Furthermore, in 1978 the United States provided the nuclear umbrella to South Korea, in order to compensate for blocking the Park Jeong Hee regime's nuclear weapons development scheme.

In 1991 the United States removed the tactical nuclear weapons that had been stationed in South Korea, but it maintains several plans for a nuclear strike against North Korea.

In 1998 it was revealed that at the Seymour Johnson air force base, the US military had carried out a nuclear employment exercise that involved dropping BDU-38 dummy nuclear bombs on North Korea.



The United States' plan for a nuclear attack on North Korea

The SK-US Combined Forces Command has developed Operation Plans 5026, 5027, 5029. Its operation plans are based on nuclear strike and preemptive attack strategy and aim at the overthrow of the North Korean regime and occupation of North Korea.

Operation Plan 5029 assumes six different scenarios such as a military coup, regime change, an outflow of WMD (weapons of mass destruction), the seizure of many South Koreans as hostages, a mass exodus of North Koreans, and even large-scale natural disasters in North Korea. Operation Plan 5029 is a very provocative plan because it envisions thrusting military forces into North Korea in peace time rather than war time, in order to seize North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear installations.

The Obama administration also contradicts its own advocacy for a nuclear-free world by pursuing its present policy toward North Korea. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, North Korea is referred to as practically the only country against which the United States could deliver a preemptive strike with nuclear weapons.

At the annual SK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in 2013, they adopted the tailored deterrent strategy that would involve a preemptive attack against North Korea if there appeared to be any sign that North Korea would use either nuclear weapons or biological and chemical weapons.

Trends in maintaining and developing North Korea's nuclear capacity

North Korea's nuclear development originated due to the US' hostile policy toward North Korea, based on the threat of using nuclear weapons. Even the Atlantic Council report (April 2007) points out that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is due to "fear of a U.S. military action" against North Korea.

"Despite U.S. assurances that it has 'no intention' to invade North Korea, fear of a U.S. military action drives North Korea's preparations for war and for achieving a nuclear deterrent." (A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA, Report of the Atlantic Council Working Group on North Korea, April 2007)

In 1985 North Korea became a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in 1992 it brought into force the Safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In 1993 North Korea protested against the United States' and IAEA's demands for special inspections and notified the UN Security Council that it intended to withdraw from the NPT (the first North Korean nuclear crisis). However, as the United States gave assurances that it "would not use or threaten to use military force including nuclear weapons", North Korea suspended its withdrawal from the NPT.

In 1994 the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea was concluded, which contained provisions for freezing the activity of the Yeong Byeon nuclear reactor.

In article 3 of the Agreed Framework, the US provided negative security assurance to North Korea (NSA: states that possess nuclear weapons assure that they will not use nuclear weapons, or threaten to use them, against non-nuclear states). This is the first and last case of the United States providing, in the form of a treaty (agreement), negative security assurance.

In the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush administration revoked the negative security assurance that had been provided to North Korea; marked North Korea as a nation targeted for a preemptive nuclear attack; and eventually abrogated the Agreed Framework (the second North Korean nuclear crisis) by voicing suspicions that North Korea was developing highly enriched uranium (HEU).

In 2003, the United States illegally invaded Iraq and overthrew the Hussein regime. Such a violation of international law had a decisive influence on North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.

After North Korea's 2003 withdrawal from the NPT, from 2006 until the present, it has carried out a total of three nuclear tests.

The SK-US tailored deterrent strategy as an anti-North Korea preemptive strike strategy

The SK-US authorities introduced the tailored deterrent strategy (to be developed as an operation plan until 2015) to counter what was called North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile threat, and are building the kill-chain and the triangular SK-US-Japan missile defense network as a means to implement this strategy.

SK-US defense authorities assume three phases of North Korea's use of nuclear weapons. They are divided into the threat phase, the impending phase, and the use phase.

In the impending phase, which is said to be when there seem to be indications that North Korea is going to use nuclear weapons and missiles, a preemptive strike will be launched against North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles by means of the kill-chain system. And in the use phase, the SK-US military will intercept the surviving North Korean missiles by means of the SK-US missile defense system.

The tailored deterrent strategy is a violation of international law that makes a preemptive attack illegal.

As South Korea's Joint Staff members have said, if it comes to executing a preemptive attack in response to signs of North Korea's use of biological and chemical weapons, a conventional war will develop into a nuclear war.

On that point, this strategy is nothing other than a reckless strategy that takes the Korean people hostage and puts their survival at risk.

The tailored deterrent strategy is a violation of international law that makes a preemptive attack illegal.

Consequently, there is increased danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

The tailored deterrent strategy, the kill-chain system, and the missile defense system, as means to put the strategy into action, will not remove the danger of war. On the contrary, they are a strategy and fighting power that may trigger a war and escalate that war into a nuclear exchange.

If a preemptive attack is launched because it seems that North Korea's use of nuclear weapons and missiles is imminent, in other words, because a war crisis has been created, it will make it impossible to turn the crisis situation back to a peace state. Consequently, if the SK-US armed forces conduct operations based on the tailored deterrent strategy as in spring 2013, it will be exactly like the risk of war on the Korean peninsula becoming a real war.

North Korea is virtually the only country that is targeted for a nuclear attack by the United States. In the event that North Korea -- which is overwhelmingly inferior in conventional military capabilities -- is subjected to a preemptive attack from the US and SK, it will be driven to the extremity of employing nuclear weapons.

Shortly before the 2014 Eulji Freedom Guardian war exercise, the United States deployed three B-2 Stealth fighter-bombers in forward positions on Guam. Thereupon, North Korea responded, saying, "Nuclear weapons will be countered with nuclear weapons".

This is precisely the reason why it will be difficult to avoid a nuclear war if war breaks out on the Korean peninsula.

The SK-US Combined Counter-Provocation Plan will make a limited, local war escalate into a full-scale, general war.

The Combined Counter-Provocation Plan, signed by SK and the US in March 2013, is also a very aggressive strategic plan.

Under this contingency plan, SK-US military will strike not only the starting point of NK's provocation but also supporting and commanding units, should the North Korea military cause provocations anywhere in the entire area of the Military Demarcation Line or around the northwestern islands in the vicinity of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea.

It turns out that according to this plan, within the US fighting power that supports the South Korean armed forces, there are not only the United States Forces Korea (USFK) but also the US Forces Japan, and even the fighting power of the Pacific Command is included.

However, when a counterattack is made against supporting units and commanding units, in response to North Korea's local provocations, it is an excessive measure of self-defense, violating the principle of proportionality as stated in international law. It is also an adventurist idea that would escalate a local, limited war into a full-scale, general war.

If, based on the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan, the SK-US armed forces conduct military operations, it is unavoidable that a local war like the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island will escalate into a general war.

Military operational control authority is the essence of military sovereignty.

According to the SK constitution, it is the president's responsibility to preserve the nation's independence and territorial integrity.

In order to discharge this duty the president exercises the prerogative of supreme command (military command authority+military administrative authority).

Operation control authority is the essence of the prerogative of supreme command. Accordingly, if it is impossible for the president to exercise operation control authority, that itself signifies that the South Korean president is not able to defend South Korea's own independence and territorial integrity.

The reality is that not South Korea, but the United States exercises (wartime) operation control authority over the SK armed forces. Therefore, the SK president himself (or herself) cannot

defend the nation's independence and territorial integrity. Former president Roh Moo Hyun said, "If war breaks out, the SK president doesn't even have command authority over ROK armed forces". He deeply deplored the unconstitutional restriction of South Korea's military sovereignty.

In this way, operation control authority is the ultimate stronghold for the purpose of defending national independence and territory and the national interest. Accordingly, operation control authority is a national right, for the sake of the country's existence as a nation, and is absolutely inalienable.

Hence, in order to protect its national independence and territorial integrity and to resolve the national issue of peaceful reunification, South Korea itself must not hesitate to take back wartime operation control authority.

The return of operation control authority postponed indefinitely

The Park Geun Hye administration and the United States signed what is called “a memorandum of understanding that called for the transfer of wartime operational control to be ‘conditions based’” on October 23, 2014. This will delay the return of wartime operation control (OPCON) for an indefinite period of time.

As one of the conditions needed for the OPCON transfer, SK-US authorities refer to the “core military capabilities” against North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. Core military capabilities point to the construction of a so-called kill-chain and missile defense system.

However, no matter how much the SK and US strengthen the kill-chain and missile defense system, North Korea, by building up its nuclear weapons and missile capability, can render useless the kill-chain and missile defense system. Because of that, the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles has not been resolved and the situation has become such that neither North nor South can escape from the vicious cycle of the security dilemma.

Accordingly, the assertion that operational control authority will be returned after the kill-chain and missile system have been completed means that operational control authority will remain perpetually in the United States’ hands.

By means of continuing to exercise wartime operation control over the SK armed forces, the United States obtains the strategy and fighting power that enable it to inflict a preemptive strike (war) on North Korea at any

time, citing the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles.

Moreover, it is possible for the US to build the triangular SK-US-Japan missile defense network, and it is possible for the US to manipulate to its own advantage the clash of interests among South Korea, the United States, and Japan centering around the intelligence and interception operation.

Going further, to postpone the return of OPCON gives a leverage to the US in its effort to build the SK-Japan military alliance. By doing so, it backs up the United States' strategic interests in establishing an iron ring around China and North Korea, and reinforcing US domination in Northeast Asia.

If the SK-US-Japan missile defense system and the military alliance are constructed, South Korea becomes militarily subordinate to Japan, and finds itself in military confrontation with China.

In this way, by the indefinite postponement of the return of wartime operation control authority, the political and military strategies oriented toward peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula have been essentially prevented from developing independently.

Also as a result of postponing OPCON transfer, it means that South Korea cannot resume its position among the countries directly involved in the conclusion of a peace agreement.

Hence to return wartime operation control is a first step for the sake of concluding a Korean peninsular peace agreement, thereby progressing toward self-reliance and reunification, and for the sake of establishing a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Peace and Common Security.

Japan's exercise of the right to collective self-defense: Aiming for the position of Asia's dominant power and re-invasion.

Article 9 of Japan's peace constitution stipulates the renunciation of the right of belligerency and the non-maintenance of war potential. In accordance with this, successive Japanese governments have come to take the position that Japan cannot exercise the right to collective self-defense.

However, the Abe administration, by reinterpreting article 9 of the constitution, made a cabinet decision (July 1, 2014) that Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense, thereby setting out on the path of renewed aggression and war.

Subsequently, the Abe administration replaced the existing three necessary conditions for the use of force (the self-defense forces) with new three necessary conditions. The former allowed Japan to use force as a means of individual self-defense only when Japan comes under armed attack. However, under the latter (new three necessary conditions), Japan could use military force when a nation with a close relationship to Japan comes under armed attack. The Abe administration lists eight instances when Japan can exert the right to collective self-defense, such as missile defense operation with the US or mine clearance.

Through exercising the right to collective self-defense, the Abe government is aiming to contain China and striving to occupy the position of the leading power in Asia.

The so-called right to collective self-defense that Japan intends to exercise is a violation of the United Nations charter.

The United States is behind the Abe government's exercise of the right of collective self-defense. The United States policies call for containing China and blockading North Korea in order to maintain and reinforce its own dominant position in Northeast Asia. It is on the basis of these policies that the US encourages Japan to make itself a great military power and to exercise the right to collective self-defense.

The right to collective self-defense is the right recognized in article 51 of the UN charter. However, it is authorized as legal collective self-defense only when there is a reciprocal relationship between nations that are very close to each other geographically or due to other specific circumstances, and therefore an armed attack on one country can be regarded as an attack on another country.

Exercise of this right is authorized only until the Security Council takes the necessary measures.

However, the right of collective self-defense that Japan wants to exercise is different from the "right of collective self-defense" in article 51 of the UN charter; it is collective defense based on the US-Japan alliance. If the collective defense which is based on the military alliance (an organization for war preparations in peace time) is regarded as collective self-defense, it means that the UN charter, which makes war illegal, and the collective security structure centered on the UN, are made completely ineffectual.

If Japan exercises its right to collective self-defense, can Japan's self-defense forces enter the Korean peninsula without the prior consent of South Korea?

The first target area where Japan wants to exercise the right of collective self-defense is none other than the Korean peninsula. Japan can dispatch its troops (self-defense forces) to the Korean peninsula in the name of protecting its nationals in case of an emergency on the Korean peninsula.

Furthermore, at the request of the United States, Japanese self-defense forces are to join combined operations or exercises of the SK-US combined forces. Of course, in such a situation, if Japan's self-defense forces are to enter the territorial waters and air space of South Korea, they must obtain the prior consent of South Korea.

However, even without the consent of South Korea, the Japan's self-defense forces could enter the Korean peninsula. If the United States, which exercises (wartime) operational control over the SK armed forces, asks Japan's self-defense forces to enter Korean territory, SK couldn't refuse it. Moreover, as a member of a UN multinational force, the Japanese self-defense forces can participate in what is called a North Korean occupation and stabilization operation.

Until now, the Abe government has not talked about participating in UN-led collective security operations (PKO), but Japan is likely to participate in such operations if article 9 of the constitution is revised, or even before the constitution is revised.

Through Japan's exercise of the right to collective self-defense, if the military confrontation and arms race are intensified in Northeast Asia, the confrontation between the SK-US-Japan bloc and the North Korea-China-Russia bloc could become solidified.

Thus, Japan's so-called right to collective self-defense is incompatible with peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula.



The triangular SK-US-Japan missile defense system which disturbs the strategic order of Northeast Asia

By means of establishing the triangular SK-US-Japan missile defense system, the United States is trying to change the strategic order in Northeast Asia from the US current relative superiority to absolute US supremacy.

The United States is constructing missile defense networks around the world. If it becomes capable of intercepting missiles launched from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and so on, the United States will come to have absolute superiority in nuclear forces. To accomplish this, the United States is building regional missile defense networks that unite the MD assets of each nation in each region of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. And going forward, it is building a missile defense network on a global level, which will tie together these regional missile defense networks as a single unit.

However, the construction of the American missile defense network will call forth efforts by North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran to strengthen their capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles in order to counter the US' MD. Thus, an unlimited arms race will be started, and there will be even greater reliance on nuclear weapons in military operations.

The USFK's THAAD installation will change South Korea into an outpost for the US-Japan MD strategy!

THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is one of the central systems of the United States' missile defense (MD). THAAD's radar AN/TPY-2 has a detection radius of over 1000 km. If this radar is deployed in SK, it can detect ballistic missiles flying from China's eastern and northern areas such as Shanghai, Beijing, Dalian, and Tunghwa toward the US mainland, Hawaii, Guam, Japan, Okinawa, and so on. The United States' principal aim in deploying THAAD in South Korea is to provide the United States and Japan early warning about Chinese ballistic missiles. Also, THAAD is able to intercept ballistic missiles flying from China's eastern and northern areas toward US forces in South Korea.

In this way, if the THAAD system is introduced, South Korea will become an outpost of the intelligence and operation (interception) of the US missile defense system. THAAD is of little use for intercepting North Korea's ballistic missiles, while it will increase tension with China and impose an intolerable burden on South Korea's national security and national economy. Xinhua News Agency already warned about this as follows :

"If THAAD is deployed in the ROK, it will sacrifice relations with China." (Xinhua News May 29, 2014)

The SK-US-Japan military information sharing arrangement for the purpose of establishing a triangular SK-US-Japan military alliance

SK, the US, and Japan signed the military information sharing arrangement on December 29, 2014. It entangles South Korea in the US-Japan missile defense network and incorporates the SK missile defense system as a subordinate system into the United States' Northeast Asia missile defense network. Through information sharing among these three countries, the United States is able to establish an SK-US-Japanese triangular missile defense network.

The so-called information on North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles that SK can obtain by the arrangement, rather than being information necessary for South Korea to defend itself, is an early warning needed mainly for the US and Japan to conduct combined missile defense against China and North Korea.

In this system, if South Korea is the first to detect intelligence of ballistic missiles heading toward Japan or the United States and hands over that information to Japan or the United States, the United States and Japan will intercept these missiles.

Moreover, if the triangular SK-US-Japan missile defense network is established, then SK-Japan military relations will be extended into the areas of intelligence, operation, and logistics. Actually it means that it establishes an SK-Japan alliance and on some occasions it is possible that SK's troops will be under the Japanese commanders or that SK's military

Towards a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Common Security and Peace instead of the SK-US-Japan alliance: The first step is a Korean peninsula peace agreement!

***Alliance: "Latent war community in peacetime or in an emergency, based on the concept of a common enemy" (Korean National Defense University, Security Relations Glossary, 2001). Examples: NATO, US-Japan alliance, SK-US alliance.**

***Collective security: a system of states that join together, usually by treaty, to renounce the use of force and pledge to take common action against any state(s) that breach(es) the peace. Examples: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia).**

will be subordinate to Japan in the areas of intelligence, logistics, etc.

How absurd this is: With our own hands we are underpinning Japan's exercise of the right of collective self-defense and giving aid to the re-invasion of the Korean peninsula by the Japanese armed forces.

A military alliance will not give security and peace to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. The only solution is the establishment of a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Common Security and Peace. That first step begins

together with the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement.

The United States has bilateral alliances both with SK and Japan. The United States is trying to unite these separate alliances into an SK-US-Japan alliance. That is because the United States, which longs to maintain and reinforce its own dominance in Northeast Asia, regards the triangular SK-US-Japan alliance as a critical means of containing China, Russia, and North Korea.

If the triangular SK-US-Japan alliance is established, Northeast Asian states divided into two hostile blocs, will

confront each other in an interminable arms race, much more intensified than before, and the entire region will suffer from endless conflicts and war.

Accordingly, in order to reduce the possibility of confrontation and war due to the alliance, and in order to establish peace firmly, all countries of Northeast Asia together must build a Cooperative Community for Peace on the basis of common security.

Considering geopolitical conditions such as the historical experience of Japanese colonial rule and continued ideological conflict since the Cold War, it is not easy to construct a multilateral common security organization in Northeast Asia. The breakthrough will come together with the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement.

If, by means of concluding a Korean peninsula peace agreement, the hostile relations between North Korea and the United States, and between South and North Korea, are resolved, and if the first step is taken toward the construction of a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Common Security and Peace, it will restrain the greed of the United States, Japan, China, and Russia for domination in Northeast Asia and also it will be possible to construct a multilateral common security organization oriented toward cooperation and peace.

In the 2005 September 19 Joint Statement and the 2007 Initial Actions for the Implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement, all the countries in the Six-Party Talks agreed to open talks in order to establish “a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula”, “a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism”, and “normalization of NK-US relations”.



Live In peace!

In order to reach genuine peace on the Korean peninsula

The basic reason why peace could not be established on the Korean peninsula is that ever since the Korean War, the hostile confrontation has continued, in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust between North Korea and the United States, and between South and North Korea. For a resolution of such hostile relations, it is necessary to address the security concerns of the countries that are involved.

In order to resolve all of the security concerns of the involved countries, it is essential to conclude a Korean peninsula peace agreement. This peace agreement will provide for actions for countries that are directly involved (SK, NK, US, China) to be implemented simultaneously. They are as follows:

To end the US' long-standing hostile policy toward North Korea (the SK-US military alliance, the nuclear umbrella that the United States provides for South Korea, the large-scale annual war exercises, the presence of the USFK); to end the North Korea-China alliance; to abolish North Korean nuclear weapons; to reduce conventional weapons possessed by South Korea and North Korea to the appropriate level.

Moving forward, it is necessary to organize a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Common Security and Peace so as to back up the Korean peninsula peace structure and to realize peace in Northeast Asia.

Toward a world without nuclear weapons

In order to reach a nuclear-weapons-free world, the United States, Russia, and other countries that possess nuclear weapons must take the lead in the following areas:

- meeting in good faith their responsibility for nuclear disarmament as stipulated in article 6 of the NPT
- abandoning the doctrine of first-use nuclear weapons, and forgoing the nuclear umbrella
- committing themselves to providing non-nuclear-weapon countries with legally binding negative security assurance (NSA)
- concluding a Convention on Nuclear Weapons

The numbers of nuclear war heads of countries

country	USA	Russia	China	North Korea
total	7700	8500	240	not available
tactical nuclear weapons	200	2000	not available	

*Source: SIPRI Yearbook (2013)

**Japan possesses sufficient plutonium to produce more than 30,000 nuclear weapons.

How to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons

Kim Kye-gwan, NK's chief delegate to the Six-Party Talks, February 2009 :

The NK's conditions for giving up nuclear weapons program are "termination of the US' hostile policy toward North Korea, removal of the nuclear umbrella, and abrogation of the SK-US military alliance".

North Korean Foreign Ministry announcement, January 2010:

"If a peace agreement is concluded, it will resolve the hostile relations between North Korea and the United States and will give impetus to rapid denuclearization of the Korean peninsula."

North Korean National Defense Committee statement, April 2013:

"Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the unshakable will of our military and people."

North Korean National Defense Committee spokesperson 2013 :

"Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is not only the deathbed instruction of President Kim Il Sung and National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong Il but also a political task that necessarily must be carried out by the party, the nation, and the tens of millions of soldiers and citizens."

A peace agreement is the most reliable method for securing peace.


The Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953 offers a guarantee for an end to military hostilities, but it does not guarantee a complete recovery of peace on the Korean peninsula. Politically, and in international law, a peace agreement is the most reliable conflict resolution method for guaranteeing peace.

In article 4, clause 60 of the Armistice Agreement, its signatories (the military commanders) “**recommend to the governments of the countries concerned a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc**”.

A Korean peninsula peace agreement will provide for responsibilities of the countries involved: the United States should abrogate its hostile policy toward North Korea, and North Korea should give up its nuclear weapons. Also the SK-US alliance and the North Korea-China alliance should be dissolved and disarmament should be enforced on the Korean peninsula. This means a peace mechanism is built on the Korean peninsula under which none of the countries involved, the United States, South Korea, or North Korea, could start a war.

Who will be the signatories of the Korean peace agreement?
They must be the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China.

The United States is a signatory party to the Armistice Agreement. The US is stationing its own troops in SK, in case of war it plans to dispatch



reinforcement troops, and now exercises operation control over SK's armed forces.

Hence the United States would become the leading belligerent in an emergency. Therefore the United States should necessarily be included among the signatory countries of a Korean

peninsula peace agreement. If the United States is not legally bound to the peace agreement, such an agreement couldn't fulfill the requirements of international law, and couldn't serve to end the state of war and guarantee the state of peace on a legal and institutional basis.

The history of seeking to conclude a peace agreement

The Armistice Agreement, article 4, clause 60, July 27, 1953:

“In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”

The Geneva Conference (April 26 - June 15, 1954):

In accordance with article 4, clause 60, of the Armistice Agreement, the conference was opened in Geneva, Switzerland, with 19 countries participating. South Korea and the United States insisted on “general elections in North and South Korea under United Nations’ supervision” and “the prior withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces”. On the other hand, North Korea insisted on “general elections in North and South Korea by an all-Korean commission under the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission’s supervision” and “the withdrawal of all foreign forces within six months”. Mutual agreement could not be reached. The Conference was closed with issues left unresolved.

The Four-Party Talks, March 1997 - August 1999:

The Four-Party Talks, which were started on the initiative of SK president Kim Young Sam and US president Bill Clinton, were held in six rounds

over two and a half years. However, there were different views on whether or not the agenda of the talks included “the withdrawal of the United States Forces Korea (USFK)” and “a peace agreement”. Finally the talks broke down.

The North Korea-United States Joint Communiqué, October 12, 2000:

“... the two sides agreed there are a variety of available means, including the Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.”

For the first time since the Armistice Agreement, there was a shared outlook between North Korea and the United States concerning the construction of a Korean peninsula peace regime.

September 19 Joint Statement at the Six-Party Talks in 2005:

“The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”

To conclude a peace agreement and construct a peace regime on the Korean peninsula emerged as the present subjects for negotiation.

October 14 Declaration in 2007:

Clause 4: “The South and the North both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime. The South and the North have also agreed to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four countries directly related declare an end to the war on the Korean Peninsula.”

This is the first agreement between the South and North on converting the armistice regime to a peace regime.

A peace agreement that will open up a shortcut to peace and prosperity

A Korean peninsula peace agreement will provide for responsibilities of each party, such as North Korea's dismantling of its nuclear weapons, the United States' termination of its strategy of preemptive nuclear attack on North Korea and removal of the nuclear umbrella from South Korea, and the abrogation of the SK-US military alliance. If these are implemented in accordance with the peace agreement, the Korean peninsula would escape from the danger of nuclear war.

The antagonistic relations between North Korea and the United States, and between South and North Korea, would be resolved and military clashes, such as the shelling and fighting on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, would vanish.

North Korea would establish diplomatic ties with both the United States and Japan, then the foundation would be laid for constructing a Northeast Asia Cooperative Community for Common Security and Peace.

Confidence-building measures between the South and the North would be undertaken, and disarmament could become a reality.

Military strength (about 640,000 soldiers in 2013 in South Korea alone) can be reduced to less than half the present strength, and the national defense budget also can be reduced by more than half.

More than 17.3 trillion won (50% of the national defense budget in 2013) can be diverted and used for the social welfare budget.

A peace agreement that will establish reciprocal and equal relations between South Korea and the United States

Economic cooperation and South-North interchange will greatly expand and the road to Manchuria, Siberia, and Eurasia from the Korean peninsula will be opened wide.

Democratization of the military and the protection of soldiers' human rights also, which are becoming social issues, can be greatly improved.

If a peace agreement is concluded, the SK-US mutual defense treaty, the SK-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and other unequal treaties and agreements will be terminated. Also, the SK-US alliance and the NK-China alliance will be dismantled together, the Korean people and nation will escape from the traps of alliances, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) will withdraw, and the US military bases will be closed and returned to South Korea.

The US operation control over SK's armed forces will be given back to South Korea. With this, South Korea can escape from its long-term political and military subordination to the United States.

South Korea will no longer have to bear the burden of sharing the costs of stationing the USFK.

We will be liberated from the crimes committed by the United States' military personnel, such as the killing of two middle school girls (Hyo-sun and Mi-son), and the environmental contamination and destruction caused by US military bases.

We will also escape from economic subordination such as the humiliating SK-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The peace agreement will open the gate to reunification.

The division of the Korean peninsula was forced on the Korean people by foreign powers. The subsequent South-North confrontation, the Korean War, and other such conflicts have permitted the interference of foreign powers and have perpetuated the division.

However, the conclusion of a peace agreement will cause SK-NK confrontation to vanish and the interference of foreign powers will be stopped. If so, the Korean people can resolve independently all problems related to reunification and advance toward reunification.

At the 2002 summit meeting, SK and NK agreed on the June 15 Joint Declaration providing for a reunification method.

At the 2007 summit meeting, SK and NK adopted the October 4 Declaration and agreed to push forward the declaration of ending the Korean War and concluding a peace agreement.

These SK-NK summit agreements insure progress toward reunification.



Move toward reunification!

Is reunification a bonanza?

Park Geun Hye keeps saying that reunification is a bonanza. However, it is no more than an absorptive reunification policy.

Since early 2014, while SK and US authorities, with unprecedented openness, have mentioned “inducing change in North Korea”, they declare their ambition to cause North Korea’s regime to collapse in order to bring about an absorptive reunification into a free democratic system.

Nam Jae Jun, former director of the National Intelligence Service (SK CIA): “By 2015 we will be reunified in a free, democratic system.” “Let’s dedicate our lives to this.” (December 24, 2013)

One way of “inducing change in North Korea” is based on military coercion, and another way is precisely the reunification bonanza idea.

The reunification bonanza idea seems to spread an affirmative outlook concerning reunification among the public; it even appeals to some middle classes as well as some workers.

However, Park’s bonanza idea considers the conservative forces (which oppose peaceful reunification) as the forces that must and will lead the reunification process. It also implies the determination that conservative forces must maintain power permanently in order to assure security as well as to reunify Korea.

Hence the reunification bonanza idea and crackdown on the progressive camp are two sides of the same coin.

The reunification bonanza idea, moreover, reflects the interest of the monopolists, foreign and domestic, who have their eyes on the mineral resources and the labor force of North Korea, and the resources, markets, and distribution networks of the Northeast Asia-Siberia-Eurasia regions.

Look at the military coercion that is the other way of “inducing change in North Korea”. Coercive methods include using various forms of hardware and software, such as introducing and making a show of the preemptive attack strategy and warfighting capabilities against North Korea, training exercises that prepare for and seek to induce sudden change in North Korea, intensifying psychological warfare against North Korea, and stationing right next to the Demilitarized Zone the US troops that played the leading role in the Iraq war.

However, it is unrealistic to conclude that the North Korean regime or system will suddenly break down.

Michael Flynn, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency: “The rule of Kim Jeong Eun is firmly established.” (Hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, February 11, 2014)

Joel Wit, former official for North Korean affairs in the US Department of State, asserted: “There is little possibility that North Korea will collapse.” (No Cut News, January 15, 2014)

Reunification through absorption is a disaster!

Absorptive reunification by military force, which will involve a preemptive attack by either the South or the North, will only result in the extinction of the whole Korean people.

"When a war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, within 24 hours, more than 2,300,000 including the Seoul metropolitan area citizens, military personnel, and the USFK, will be killed or injured." (Research on South and North military power assessment by SK Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004)

Still more, high-level officials responsible for SK's security and national defense said that SK would launch a preemptive attack on North Korea even in very vague circumstances referred to as signs of a North Korean preemptive attack.

Kim Gwan Jin, Blue House National Security Director:

"If there are signs of a North Korean preemptive attack, we can make a preemptive strike on NK's long-range artillery." (November 2, 2013)

Han Min Ku, Minister of National Defense:

"In the event that North Korea causes provocations, it means that it is worried about the survival of its regime." (July 20, 2014)

The SK-US combined command's military strategy (tailored deterrence strategy) also backs up this idea.

In conclusion, it is hard to exclude the possibility that South Korea will attempt an absorptive reunification by armed attack.

It is obvious that a reunification process that absorbs North Korea into the market economy will be a disaster for

the Korean people, particularly the most vulnerable sectors of society. It will be prohibitively expensive to absorb North Korea into South Korea's free democracy. South Korean authorities can't afford such a reunification cost. Accordingly they will try to limit the living standards of the general population of both South and North. In particular they will keep NK's living standards at a minimum level in order to offset some of the enormous cost of absorption.

In the event that North Korea is absorbed and reunified into the South Korean market economy, the North Korean citizens' living standard will be even much lower than the current standards for at least a generation, similar to what happened in East Germany.

Likewise, the South Korean people will endure a reduction of welfare and social services, because reunification expenditures will require shifting financial resources away from medical, social, and other welfare services.

"South Korea cannot bear the reunification cost even if it raises funds for reunification." (Ulrich Blum, Halle Institute for Economic Research, Yonhap News, January 31, 2012)

Negative effects of German-style reunification through absorption

Even though now a full 25 years have passed since reunification, Germany is still experiencing the after-effects of reunification through absorption. For several years before and after 2005, 15 years after reunification, Germany showed more than 10% unemployment, especially in the region of former East Germany, which exhibited a murderous unemployment rate in excess of 20%. Now the situation has improved considerably, but before reunification East Germany had full employment, and West Germany also showed an unemployment rate of less than 3%, close to full employment.

As a result of reunification, Germany had to endure a decrease in union membership rate (union density), worsening working conditions, a massive replacement of regular workers by irregular workers. Universal welfare was also replaced by selective, more limited welfare. Unemployment benefits and social allowances were reduced.

In this way, Germany became the country with the most sudden deterioration and distortion of income distribution and the largest number of low-wage workers, living below the poverty line, in Europe (German Federal Statistics Bureau, “Chosun Ilbo” January 3, 2014). Hourly wages in the East German region are still stalled at 75% of wages in the West German region.



The costs of division? The costs of reunification? The benefits of reunification?

The costs of division, and the costs and benefits of reunification vary widely, depending on the research institutions and the researchers. The reason is that there are conceptual differences in the calculation of each cost and each benefit, the length of time required for reunification, the method of reunification, and so on. Taking this as a premise, we look at the SK Unification Ministry's assertions.

The costs of division: This refers to all kinds of tangible and intangible costs that are generated by perpetuating the state of division. National defense expenditures, etc. belong to the tangible costs; the sufferings of separated families, etc. belong to the intangible costs.

The costs of reunification: These include the entirety of economic and non-economic costs that will accompany reunification. They consist of the costs of integrating political, monetary, and other systems; the costs of the economic investment in production facilities and infrastructure; the costs of crisis management such as humanitarian emergency aid and the like.

The benefits of reunification: These are the economic and non-economic compensations and benefits that will be obtained by reunification. A settlement of the costs of division, and expansion of the market, etc. belong to the economic benefits; the elimination of the risk of war, increased influence in international society, etc. belong to the non-economic benefits.

On the whole, the costs of division are greater than the costs of reunification and the benefits of reunification greater than the costs of

Benefits of reunification \geq Costs of division $>$ Reunification costs

division. The costs of division are long-term and wasteful expenditures. Reunification costs are relatively short-term and potentially profitable investment costs. In general, the costs of division are greater than the costs of reunification.

However, if Korea is reunified through absorption; and if the reunification

process is protracted, so that the time period of expenditure for reunification could increase, and if the living standard of North Korean residents is quickly raised to the South Korean residents' living standard, then the costs of reunification could become greater than the costs of division.



Estimating the benefits of reunification

Benefits obtained by decreasing the military budget: South Korea's military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, as of 2012, was about 2.6%; reunited German military expenditure is about 1.2% of GDP.

Accordingly, if we assume the ratio of the SK military expenditure to the GDP after reunification as 1.2%, the same as Germany, the annual cost of division is 1.4% of SK GDP, taking into account the current military budget.

Since South Korea's 2012 GDP was 1,377 trillion won, 1.4% of this, 19 trillion won, can be called the costs of division. This money is equivalent to about 1.6 times

the 12 trillion won of annual university registration fees, and is enough to fund the conversion of more than 3 million irregular workers to regular worker status.

"The real GDP size of reunified Korea in 2050 will reach 6.5 trillion US dollars and overtake Germany and France and it will become the 8th largest economy in the world." (Goldman Sachs Report, "A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks", September 21, 2009)

Calculating the reunification costs following reunification by absorption

National research institutes such as the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) calculated that reunification costs will amount to at least 831 trillion won and possibly as much as 7000 trillion won.

In the event that, as was done in Germany, the North Korean residents' income is raised to the level of the South Korean residents' income, reunification costs will come to approximately 7000 trillion won.

This vast sum is equivalent to about twice the cost of German reunification, estimated to be 2 trillion euros (about 3,548 trillion won). It would be difficult for the South Korean economy to deal with such an amount.

Even in the event that the North Korean residents' income is lifted to only 50% of the level of the South Korean residents' income, Korean reunification costs would amount to 4,746 trillion won, exceeding German reunification costs.

If the sum of 3,600 trillion won, a level similar to Germany's reunification costs, is invested in Korean reunification, it is calculated that the expense for improving the North Korean residents' standard of living will amount to only about 6% (227 trillion won) of the total reunification costs. This falls far short of the approximate share of German reunification expenditures (about 50%) devoted to the East German residents' wages, welfare costs, etc. Because of that, arguments are even being presented to the effect that the North Korean residents must accept a restriction of labor's three major rights for a definite period of time after Korean reunification by absorption.

Realistic, rational, and desirable reunification is peaceful reunification by SK-NK agreement!

The most realistic way to reach reunification is not through absorption following the collapse of the North Korean regime or system. It must be a mutually agreed reunification, based on the agreements already made by the South and North, such as the July 4 South-North Joint Declaration that clarified the Three Principles of National Unification (independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity); the agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchange and cooperation between South and North; the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration which contains an agreed reunification plan; the October 4 Declaration that includes the aim of constructing a peace regime, and so on.

Peaceful reunification by mutual agreement can realize the three Principles of National Unification. It can persuade North Korea and surrounding countries to accept the creation of a united Korea. In this context, peaceful reunification by agreement is the most realistic way. It is also the most rational way, in that it can minimize the impact and costs of reunification and minimize the resistance to it.

Peaceful reunification by SK-NK agreement is the most desirable way, in that it can guarantee the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and that it can prevent human suffering and physical damage.

A reunification plan and a reunified national system that South and North can agree on?

South Korea's plan is "The Unification Plan for One National Community (Korean commonwealth)".

North Korea's reunification plan is "The Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (federal system)".

At South-North summits, both sides have agreed on the "confederal/federal system" plan for reunification, which is provided for in clause 2 of the June 15 Joint Declaration.

June 15 Joint Declaration, clause 2 :

"For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction."

South Korea's confederation plan and North Korea's loose federation plan have in common the idea that a transition period has to precede complete reunification.

One of Korea's most urgent tasks in the reunification process is to give shape to a confederal/federal reunification plan with specific application to the transition phase.

In practical terms, this might be achieved by giving more political, diplomatic, and military authority to South/North local governments than to the confederal/federal (central) government in the early period, and later to reverse this arrangement and give more political, diplomatic, and military authority to the central government.

"56.4% of the SK people are in favor of maintaining South and North systems or combining the two systems." (Seoul National University Institute for Reunification and Peace Research, 2013, Survey of Opinion on Reunification)

After the transition period of confederal/federal unification, South and North would move toward achieving complete reunification (system integration).

The reunified nation's system must make the most of the positive aspects of the South-North systems, eliminate the negative aspects, and initiate a new system that all residents of South and North can accept.

According to a public opinion poll on reunification by Seoul National University's Institute for Reunification and Peace Research in 2012, it showed that only 43.6% of the South Korean people were in favor of reunification into the South Korean system. The other 56.4% were in favor of maintaining the two systems of South and North Korea or combining them.


In the process of reunification, South and North should use their combined strength to create a new common security and peace regime in Northeast Asia. The united Korean peninsula must be an independent and peaceful nation, a welfare state that disavows the domination, alliances, and wars of surrounding powers.

Peace agreement Q & A

Hot potatoes: Abolition of North Korea's nuclear weapons and withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea.

The two questions of the abolition of North Korea's nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of the US troops are the most important issues related to the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement.

For the sake of advancing the conclusion of a peace agreement, it is certainly necessary to have a correct understanding of these two issues.



Q: What if North Korea won't give up its nuclear weapons?

A: North Korea's giving up its nuclear weapons depends on whether or not the United States abandons its hostile policy toward North Korea.

North Korea declared that Korean peninsula denuclearization is impossible and its constitution states that North Korea is a nuclear power. This means that to that extent, it will be difficult for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.

However, North Korea's position on Korean peninsula denuclearization is: "Considering the obvious condition that the US' hostile policy toward North Korea has not changed even slightly, Korean peninsula denuclearization will not be possible before worldwide denuclearization is realized." (NK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2013)

This is an assertion that Korean peninsula denuclearization is possible on the condition that the US' hostile policy toward North Korea is changed.

The US' hostile policy toward North Korea is the cause of the North Korean nuclear problem.

If the cause is settled (abandoning the hostile policy toward North Korea), the result also can be resolved (North Korea's abandoning its nuclear weapons).

Accordingly, North Korea's abandoning its nuclear weapons does not depend on the North Korean constitution; it depends entirely on whether or not the United States abandons its hostile policy toward North Korea.

According to whether or not the United States abandons its hostile policy toward North Korea, it is possible that North Korea's nuclear weapons could be abandoned within a short time, and also possible that North Korea would remain in possession of them for a long period.

Although North Korea's statement of 2012, cited above, connects Korean peninsula denuclearization with worldwide denuclearization, it is believed that the statement is based on the assumption that the US hostile

policy toward North Korea will remain unchanged. The statement should be understood within the context of that assumption.

The reason is that, given the condition that the United States refuses to change its hostile policy, North Korea can escape from the US nuclear threat only if worldwide denuclearization is achieved.

To put it another way, Korean peninsula denuclearization can be realized even before the achievement of worldwide denuclearization only if the United States abandons its hostile policy toward North Korea.

In February 2009, during a visit to North Korea by some United States' representatives, Kim Kye-gwan—at that time North Korea's chief delegate to the Six-Party Talks—presented to them North Korea's conditions for giving up its nuclear weapons: “Termination of the US' hostile policy toward North Korea, removal of the nuclear umbrella, and abrogation of the SK-US military alliance.” On the other hand, he did not present worldwide denuclearization as a condition. That makes it clear that for North Korea, worldwide denuclearization, as a condition for its own relinquishing of nuclear weapons, is a long-term option. It is not an absolute demand nor an immediate precondition for Korean denuclearization. North Korea implies that it reserves the right to invoke worldwide denuclearization as a condition for giving up its own nuclear arms if there appears to be no prospect of the United States ever renouncing its hostile anti-NK policy.

If we understand North Korea's position on denuclearization as an assertion that North Korea cannot abandon nuclear weapons on any kind of conditions whatever; or if we understand it as an assertion that it is possible to realize Korean peninsula denuclearization only if worldwide denuclearization is achieved, then there might be no other way than to give up the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement or to postpone it until nuclear weapons are abandoned worldwide.

It is difficult to conclude a Korean peninsula peace agreement as long as North Korea maintains nuclear weapons. It is also difficult to achieve peace and reunification as long as a Korean peninsula peace agreement cannot be concluded. Moreover, it is impossible to predict when nuclear weapons will be abolished all over the world. Not only that: Worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons is a problem that cannot be solved solely by the will and strength of the Korean people, South and North.

On the other hand, the combined efforts of all of the Korean people can in fact solve the linked problems of the US hostile anti-NK policy and the NK's possession of nuclear weapons. If the Korean people, without distinction of South and North, are committed to cooperation in this effort we can achieve the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement and peaceful reunification, much sooner than the rest of the world will reach universal abolition of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, if we take worldwide denuclearization -- which we cannot bring about only by means of our own strength -- as a condition for North Korea's abandoning its nuclear weapons and Korean peninsula denuclearization, we will miss the opportunity to conclude a peace agreement and achieve peaceful reunification, and we will commit the folly of delaying the opportunity forever.

Q: If we in the South wish to defend ourselves from North Korea's nuclear weapons, what should we do? Must we strengthen the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States? Must we also become a nuclear weapons state?

A: Korean peninsula denuclearization is the answer. It means no nuclear weapons in North Korea and no nuclear umbrella in South Korea.

The nuclear umbrella is the US nuclear strategy. The strategy here dictates that if a third country attacks South Korea, the United States will retaliate by launching its own nuclear weapons against that third country.

The United States provided the nuclear umbrella to South Korea explicitly for the first time in 1978. It was temporarily neutralized, however, by the NK-US Agreed Framework (October 21, 1994), through which the United States offered negative security assurance (NSA) to North Korea.

The nuclear umbrella, a relic of the Cold War, increases reliance on nuclear weapons in military strategy and operations. Thus it makes it more likely that a conventional war would escalate into a nuclear war.

The United States' plan for nuclear war against North Korea is as follows: Just prior to a North Korean attack on South Korea, or at an early stage in the war, the United States will strike more than 700 selected targets in the North Korean area, such as nuclear weapons and missile sites and command key points.

The tailored deterrent strategy, introduced by South Korea and the United States for the first time in 2013, is a preemptive nuclear attack

strategy aimed at North Korea. It could very probably cause escalation from a South-North crisis into a nuclear war, if the aggressive nature of this strategy matches North Korea's nuclear fighting power.

If the United States again deploys nuclear weapons in South Korea, or if South Korea comes to possess nuclear weapons, to that extent nuclear war on the Korean peninsula becomes more likely.

Furthermore, if the South comes to possess nuclear weapons, it will be impossible for South Korea to demand that North Korea abolish its own nuclear weapons.

The possession of nuclear weapons by South Korea and North Korea would necessarily lead to Japan and Taiwan acquiring nuclear weapons and a nuclear dominoes phenomenon in Northeast Asia would become unavoidable.

In particular, Japan would rise as a nuclear power, surpassing the United States and Russia, which would fundamentally disturb the strategic topography of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

As a result, the nuclear armaments of Northeast Asian nations, beginning with South Korea, would push the Northeast Asian security situation into the vortex of a nuclear confrontation that would be hard to escape.

Accordingly, the only way that can bring about regional peace is both to eliminate the US nuclear umbrella and abolish North Korea's nuclear weapons.

Further, Korean peninsula denuclearization must develop into denuclearization of Northeast Asia, which will free Northeast Asia from the danger of nuclear war. Only in that way will it be possible to strengthen Korean peninsula denuclearization and finally let peace take root.

Q: Even if a peace agreement is concluded and North Korea abolishes its nuclear weapons, isn't there still a danger that the United States would take advantage of the situation and attack North Korea?

A: However violent and aggressive the United States is, it can't and won't invade another country mindlessly.

A peace agreement is an internationally recognized legal instrument that would make it difficult for the United States to attack North Korea. It is a pledge to the international community that the parties concerned will commit themselves to mutual nonaggression. Moreover, the supervising organizations, composed of neutral countries, would be on the alert, keeping an eye on the implementation and (or) infringement of peace agreements.

The most important steps in this process, that would do more than anything else to assure North Korea's security, are the termination of the SK-US military alliance and the simultaneous withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea. USFK withdrawal means that the United States would remove the very troops that it might use to attack North Korea. And because the size of the armed forces, South and North, would be drastically reduced as part of the disarmament and peace-making processes, there would no longer be any possibility of war between South Korea and North Korea.

Of course, even if these kinds of measures are implemented, they cannot entirely eliminate the possibility that the United States might attack North Korea. As in the case of countries like Iraq and Libya, the United States could fabricate justifications for attacking North Korea.

However, even under the cease-fire regime in which a constant state of militarily tension has existed, the United States has not found it possible

to launch a full-scale attack on North Korea. It is not because there was no justification. It is due to several conditions that have developed, making it difficult, even impossible, for the United States to realize its ambition of conquering North Korea. China, Russia, and other Northeast Asian states have consistently opposed any resumption of full-scale conflict on the Korean peninsula. The United States cannot disregard North Korea military strength and the solidity of its regime. Also, the United States must take into consideration South and North Korean citizens' opposition to a resumption of the Korean War and their desire for peace.

Therefore we may conclude that, since even in the conditions of the cease-fire regime it was hard for the United States to find a pretext for invading North Korea, it means that under the conditions of a peace agreement, the United States would find it even more difficult to start a war against North Korea.

At present, the US' military power has been weakened to the extent that it is unable to wage two wars simultaneously in different regions of the world. In the event that a peace agreement

is concluded, it would be hard for the SK military to attack North Korea, in complete disregard of their own people's opposition to embarking on such a dangerous course.

It is often said that the United States has never adhered to unfavorable treaties, but after it concluded a peace agreement with Vietnam, it could not attack Vietnam again. It was not because the US' military power was weaker than that of Vietnam; rather it was because the United States could not contrive any plausible justification for renewing hostilities, or any political rationale that would persuade the American people or the rest of the people of the world of the justice of its action.

Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that the United States will attack North Korea should North Korea give up its nuclear weapons.

If we think that the United States would take the conclusion of a peace agreement as an ideal opportunity to attack North Korea, we are letting ourselves be deluded by a victim mentality. We should not be so defensive or fearful of the United States, as though it could exercise universal, absolute power.

**Q: Is it possible for South Korea to rid itself of the US troops?
Would the United States be willing to give up the privileges such as selling weapons to South Korea and having South Korea bear the cost of stationing the US troops?**

A: Many public opinion polls show that 39~62% of the South Korean people want the US troops to withdraw.

The long-term stationing of foreign forces is an abnormal condition which restricts national sovereignty. Article 4, clause 60 of the Korean War Armistice Agreement clearly refers to “withdrawal of all foreign forces” together with “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question”.

Accordingly, if a Korean peninsula peace agreement is concluded, the US troops must necessarily withdraw from Korea. In this regard, a research report of the SK Ministry of Unification (Report on activities to create the basis for a community of South and North by KINU, October 7, 2011) also cites the problem of the garrisoning of foreign troops as a topic that a Korean peninsula peace agreement must deal with.

The 1975 UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the USFK. In the 2012 US presidential campaign, too, a Republican presidential contender, Ron Paul, who advocated the withdrawal of the USFK, received considerable support from the American people.

Above all, several South Korean opinion polls have shown that 39-62% of the SK people want the US troops to withdraw from SK. (Joongang Ilbo, September 22, 2009)

The United States officials have said repeatedly that its troops would be withdrawn from any country that doesn't want them stationed there.

Former White House Press Secretary Dana Perino has said that “the US troops are only stationed in countries that want them there and that the US would withdraw troops if asked to do so”. (Yonhap News Agency, February 14, 2008)


In 2002 two middle school girls were run over and killed by a USFK armored (tracked) vehicle. This incident was an act of killing through willful negligence, but the two US soldiers -the armored vehicle driver and the navigator-were declared “not guilty” in a US military court. In order to protest against the killing of the two schoolgirls and the unfair judgment, countless demonstrations were held throughout the country, and on several occasions, hundreds of thousands of South Koreans took part in the demonstrations. This nationwide reaction and anger came as a shock to the South Korean and United States authorities.

As an effect of this, the United States made preparations for the return of wartime operational control to South Korea. In the 2002 South Korean presidential election, Roh Moo Hyun, the candidate who had insisted on equal


relations between South Korea and the United States, was elected to the presidency.

In negotiating a peace agreement, if a large number of Koreans demand the US troops’ withdrawal, it is quite possible that it will come about.

Survey of public opinion on the question “When must the US troops withdraw from SK?” (Newsweek SK edition, April 23, 2008)



Changes in the percentage of people who support USFK withdrawal (JoongAng Ilbo, September 22, 2007)



Q: Won't North Korea attack South Korea if the US troops withdraw?

A: South Korea's military power, even without the USFK, is superior to North Korea's.

As of 2008, North Korea spent the equivalent of 550 million dollars on national defense (Ministry of Unification calculation); South Korea spent 25,700 million dollars on national defense, more than 46 times what the North spent.

The National Intelligence Service (South Korean CIA) revealed in a report to the Blue House (2009) that “excluding the USFK and the US augmentation forces, South Korean military forces alone are approximately 10% superior to North Korean forces”. (Shindonga, April 2010)

The nuclear weapons capability that North Korea currently possesses (about 10 tactical nuclear weapons) is militarily of some significance for deterrent and (or) defensive purposes, but practically not significant for offensive purposes.

Hence, former president Roh Moo Hyun revealed that “Even though North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and wages war, North Korea cannot win”. (Yonhap News, December 6, 2006)

That being admitted, why does the so-called theory of the North Korean threat spread so persistently? That is because the South Korean and United States military authorities, security agencies, the arms traders, the press, etc. think that they could protect and increase their own vested interests through the continuing military tension and confrontation between South and North Korea. From this standpoint, they repeatedly aim at the citizens their propaganda and reports that exaggerate and fabricate North Korean threats.

Q: Ultimately, won't North Korea just swallow large sums of money?

A: Peace itself gives food, welfare, and security.

Peace bought at the cost of a bowl of noodles with black bean sauce

During the presidential terms of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, aid for North Korea was 1.85 trillion won (government aid -- 1.16 trillion won, non-government aid -- 0.69 trillion won). (Statistics Korea, May 15, 2014) This amount is equivalent to an annual expenditure of 3,700 won per capita of the population.

Referring to these statistics, Lee Jae Jeong, former Minister of Unification said that "South Korea enjoyed peace at a per capita cost of one bowl of noodles per year".

When Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were in office (1998-2007), the cost of supporting the USFK was as much as 16 times the cost of aid given to North Korea.

The cost of supporting the USFK for ten years amounts to 30 trillion won, including 5.99 trillion won, which is South Korea's sharing of non-personnel stationing costs of the US troops. This is 16 times the amount of aid to North Korea.

The amount of SK support for the USFK per capita (approximately 1.7 million won) is more than 17,000 times the amount of South Korean aid to the North Korean population per capita (approximately 93,000 won).

The cost of aid to North Korea is a contribution to peace. However, the cost of supporting the USFK is a contribution to preparing for a war against North Korea that must never be allowed.

Eliminating the vested interests of the SK military (national defense reform)

The SK military, which has been untouchable over the past 60 years, has been carelessly and inefficiently operated. As a consequence, while spending astronomical appropriations that amount to as much as 35 trillion won per year, it doesn't fulfill its own responsibilities for national defense.

The SK military still remains outside civilian control. The three service branches of the SK military are so poorly balanced among themselves that the army accounts for about 80% of the SK military's strength. It is incapable of establishing an independent military strategy, operation planning, and operation plans. In addition, there are far too many high-ranking officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels, generals) who enjoy excessively generous salaries and pensions. The SK military has now become synonymous with incompetence, inefficiency, and special treatment.

Hence, successive governments have come to promote military reform as a national priority, but efforts to reform the military have always been doomed to fail because of the obstinate resistance of the upper ranks of the military establishment.

The Roh Moo Hyun administration (2003-2007) was the first one to enact national defense reform ("National Defense Reform 2020"), but the Lee Myung Bak administration (2008-2012) backed away from it in all its aspects. Reduction of the national defense budget and simultaneous military reform (meaning destruction of the military's privileges and vested interests) are essential links in the chain of actions required in order

Surmounting the distorted security ideology in order to inspire Koreans with the goals of peace and reunification

to break down the security ideology of the conservative forces and advance toward democratization, peace, and reunification.

The powers of the vested interests, the privileged classes that are centered around the military, have progressively expanded their distorted security ideology (the so-called theory of the North Korean threat) in order to protect their full rice bowls and continue to benefit from special treatment.

Otherwise, there is no way to account for the fact that over the last 60 years, South Korea's Ministry of National Defense has stayed beyond the reach of reform, and the fact that the members of the military caste take it for granted that they deserve to be treated like royalty.

In the 2012 presidential election, 63% of the voters cast their ballots for Park Geun Hye, the Saenuri Party candidate. These voters included the poor, low-income workers, and the underprivileged sectors of society

in general. They voted against their own class interests and voted for a representative of the vested interests. It can be said that it was because these voters were trapped in the distorted security ideology.

The general public must shake off this distorted security mentality and equip themselves with a mentality of peace and reunification based on truth.

Must we continue to tolerate being hosts to the US troops here and share the stationing costs of the US troops in order to defend ourselves against North Korean aggression?

No!

South Korea's military power alone (meaning without the USFK) is far superior to North Korea's military power. The South Korean citizens paid 12 trillion won (about \$10 billion) for the USFK's non-personnel stationing costs during 1991-2012. This money is more than enough to pay for all the same equipment (estimated to amount to \$9.2 billion) that the USFK retains.

Is the Northern Limit Line (NLL) an international boundary?

There is a widespread, mistaken theory that the NLL is an international boundary.

Is that really so?

“Northern (Patrol) Limit Line does not have international legal status. NPLL was unilaterally established and not accepted by NK. Furthermore, insofar as it purports unilaterally to divide international waters, it is clearly contrary to international law and USG law of the sea position. Armistice provides two sides must respect each other’s ‘contiguous waters’, which negotiating history indicates would mean as maximum 12 miles.” (Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, secret telegrams sent out to the US embassy in Korea, the USFK command, and the UN command, February 28, 1975)

“The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.” (SK constitution, article 3)

Is the NLL a maritime border line?

In its 2012 National Defense White Paper, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense asserted that the NLL is “a de facto border line”, but this distorted the Armistice Agreement.

“Even when NK crosses over the NLL, it does not violate the Armistice Agreement.” (Answers to the National Assembly by Lee Yang Ho, Minister of National Defense at the time of Kim Young Sam government, July 16, 1996)

“Because the South and the North differ in their views on the maritime border line, there has been no fixed border line until now.” “In this regard, it is correct that Minister of National Defense Lee Yang Ho said that ‘encroaching on the NLL does not violate the Armistice Agreement’.” (Chosun Ilbo July 17, 1996)

The maritime demarcation line must be settled by a peace agreement.

In the October 4 Declaration, it speaks of establishing a joint fishing zone and a peaceful waters zone, which have been proposed as initiatives to resolve the boundary question and turn the West Sea (Yellow Sea) from a sea of dispute and conflict to a sea of peace and harmony.

The maritime demarcation line must be settled in the process of concluding a Korean peninsula peace agreement.


For the sake of peaceful national reunification

The constitution of the Republic of Korea states that the people of Korea, “... having assumed the mission of democratic reform and peaceful reunification of our homeland and having determined to consolidate national unity with justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love ...” (preamble);

“The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful reunification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.” (article 4); and “... shall renounce all aggressive wars.” (article 5);

“The President shall have the duty to pursue sincerely the peaceful reunification of the homeland.” (article 66, clause 3).

The mission of peaceful reunification, which is stated in the constitution, is among the constitutional rights and duties that the citizens must exercise and carry out as the masters of the country.



Let's become sowers of the seeds of peace everywhere!

Beginning in 2008, and continuing up to the present, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK) has been leading a movement that calls for the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement.

More than 50,000 people have joined this movement. As supporters of “Seeds of Peace”, they promote the proposal for the “the Korean Peninsula Peace Agreement”. The principles of this proposed Agreement are the withdrawal of the USFK, the abolition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the end of alliances, and the mutual reduction of South and North Korean conventional military forces.

Every year, to mark the anniversary of the Korean War cease-fire (July 27), SPARK also organizes public events and activities, calling for the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement.

In 2013, SPARK started the movement named “Let’s Sow the Seeds of Peace”. SPARK initiated this movement due to the realization that the conclusion of a Korean peninsula peace agreement must appeal to everyone, and must be propelled by popular demand.



We will spread the seeds of peace!

1. Distributing the “Seeds of Peace” booklet and package

We inform many people about how urgent and important it is to conclude a Korean peninsula peace agreement. First we send our close friends this booklet and package.

2. Keeping an eye on governments, especially the South Korean and United States governments; monitoring legislation and foreign policy

We watch to see whether or not the governments are pursuing policies that work against the conclusion of a peace agreement. We inform ourselves about these issues by opening the SPARK home page (peaceone.org) and inform others by SMS/text message.

3. Voting for candidates who support peaceful reunification

It is our right to live in a peaceful country!

We will vote for candidates who aim for peaceful reunification, in the local elections, National Assembly elections, and the 19th presidential election of 2017.

We will be sure to reject candidates who oppose peaceful reunification!

4. Participating in July 27 Seeds of Peace events

We will take part with others in Seeds of Peace events held on July 27, 2015.

These events are being held every year from 2013 to 2017, with such themes as: We spread the seeds, the seeds take root and sprout, the flowers blossom, the plants bear fruit.



5. Organizing Seeds groups and sharing peace activities

- Seeds of song: waking up the world by singing peace songs
- Seeds of art: Seeds of Peace exhibitions (artists, poems and pictures, etc.)
- Seeds of handicrafts : making peace arts and crafts
- Seeds of youth: 2030 young people's peace actions
- Seeds of pansori (Korean musical recitation): reciting the wish for peaceful reunification

In addition to these groups, we can work together by organizing various other Seeds groups such as groups for study, lectures, cooking, photography, hiking and trekking.

6. Walking on the peace roads together: Footsteps Toward Peace

Peace roads are roads and trails that make people aware of the significance of peace and the need for everyone to work together for peace. They are historical sites related to wars or the presence of foreign military forces.

We will design peace roads in more than 100 regions and we will walk along them together. By 2017 we aim to hold Footsteps Toward Peace events all across the country from Jeju Island to the Imjingak Park in the town of Paju near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

7. Contributing seed money for peaceful reunification

The Seeds of Peace activities are financed by voluntary donations from members and the general public. We look forward to everyone's support.



SPARK (Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization, founded in 1994, whose work is made possible by regular membership dues donated by more than 2500 members from every part of the country.

Together, SPARK's members volunteered their efforts and talents to produce this small booklet, which tells readers why it is necessary to conclude a Korean peninsula peace agreement. We look forward to your financial support so that this booklet can be widely distributed.

To make a donation:

NH Bank (NH농협) account number 539-01-145822 문규현(Mun Kyu Hyun)

Address: 2nd fl, 3-47 Beonji Chungjeongno 3 ga, Sodaemun-ku, Seoul, Republic of Korea (120-837)

Home page: www.peaceone.org | E-mail: spark946@hanmail.net

Tel: 82-2-712-84 43 | Fax: 82-2-712-84 45

평화와통일을여는사람들